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Abstract:
In this paper we introduce multiple longest traveling salesman (MLTS) games. An MLTS game
arises from a network in which a salesman has to visit each node (player) precisely once, except
its home location, in an order that maximizes the total reward. First it is shown that the value
of a coalition of an MLTS game is determined by taking the maximum of suitable combinations
of one and two person coalitions. Secondly it is shown that MLTS games with ¯ve or less players
have a nonempty core. However, a six player MLTS game may have an empty core. For the special
instance where the reward between a pair of nodes is equal to 0 or 1, we provide relations between
the structure of the core and the underlying network.
Keywords: Game theory, longest traveling salesman problem/game, multiple longest traveling
salesman problem/game, Core.
1 Introduction
A traveling salesman (TS) problem can be described by a complete undirected graph in
which the vertices represent the cities and the cost between two cities can be represented by
a cost function on the edges. The objective is to ¯nd a Hamiltonian cycle that minimizes
total cost. A Hamiltonian cycle is a tour that starts in a speci¯c city, referred to as home
city, visits all other cities exactly once and then returns to the home city. For a review on
TS problems we refer to Lawler et al. (1997). An important variant of the TS problem is the
longest traveling salesman (LTS) problem. Here the cost function on the edges is replaced
by a reward function. The objective in an LTS problem is to ¯nd a Hamiltonian cycle
¤Corresponding author
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Borm), H.J.M.Hamers@uvt.nl (Herbert Hamers).that maximizes total rewards. For a review on LTS problems we refer to Lewenstein and
Sviridenko (2003), Blokh and Gutin (1995) and Barvinok et al. (2002). Multiple traveling
salesman (MTS) and multiple longest traveling salesman (MLTS) problems are relaxations
of TS and LTS problems respectively. The objective is to ¯nd a weak Hamiltonian cycle that
minimizes costs in case of MTS problems and maximizes rewards in case of MLTS problems.
A weak Hamiltonian cycle is a tour that starts and ends in the home city and visits each
city once except the home city that can be revisited several times.
Cooperative transferable utility MLTS (LTS) games arising from MLTS (LTS) problems
are the object of study of this paper. Given an MLTS (LTS) problem we identify each vertex
in the graph, except the one corresponding to the home location, with a player. Then the
value of a coalition in an MLTS (LTS) game is de¯ned as the maximum reward this coalition
can obtain by solving the MLTS (LTS) problem on the complete subgraph on the vertices
corresponding to this coalition and the home location. It is shown that the the value of a
coalition of an MLTS game is determined as the maximum of suitable combinations of 1-
and 2-person subcoalitions.
We show that MLTS games have a nonempty core if the number of players is at most
¯ve. MLTS games need not have core elements if the number of players is at least six. For
the special case when the reward function on the edges only takes values 0 or 1 we provide
relations between the structure of the core and the underlying 1-graph. Here the 1-graph is
the subgraph of the complete graph that contains exactly those edges with reward equal to
1. We show that if the 1-graph is Hamiltonian then the core is the convex hull of speci¯c
(0;1)-vectors. If the 1-graph is a line graph we show that the game is convex and therefore
the core is nonempty. If the 1-graph is a traceable 1-sum of Hamiltonian and line graphs, we
can characterize a nonempty subset of the core. If the 1-graph is a tree the core is nonempty
(cf. LeBreton et al. (1992)).
Finally we discuss the relation between TS games, introduced by Potters, Curiel and Tijs
(1992), and MTS games, LTS games and MLTS games.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we formally introduce MLTS games. Section
3 provides the various results on the core and section 4 considers the relation between MLTS
games and MTS games.
22 Multiple longest traveling salesman games
In this section we introduce longest traveling salesman games and multiple longest trav-
eling salesman games.
Let N0 = f0;1;2;:::;ng denotes the set of cities that a salesman has to visit, where city
0 is the home city of the salesman. Let T = (tij) be an N0£N0-matrix where tij denotes the
rewards of going from city i to city j, with i;j 2 N0. We assume tij ¸ 0, tij = tji and tii = 0
for every i;j 2 N0. The network (N0;T) is usually represented by the complete graph on N0
with rewards tij on the edges.
In a longest traveling salesman (LTS) problem a salesman, starting in city 0, has to visit
each of the other cities exactly once and has to return to city 0 at the end of the journey.
The order of the cities is selected in such a way that the total rewards are maximized.
In a multiple longest traveling salesman (MLTS) problem again the salesman has to visit
each city exactly once but now the home city can be revisited several times instead of only
at the start and the end of the journey.
LTS (MLTS) games arise from LTS (MLTS) problems if one associates players to the set
of cities N = f1;:::;ng and each coalition of players faces an LTS (MLTS) problem.
Before formally introducing LTS and MLTS games we will ¯x some notation. For any
S ½ N we denote by ¦(S) the set of bijective functions ¼ : f1;:::;jSjg ! S, where ¼(k)
denotes the player that is visited in kth position in the tour on cities in S induced by ¼.
Associated to each ¼ 2 ¦(S) we de¯ne the function ¼ : f0;1;:::;jSj;jSj + 1g ! S [ f0g
such that ¼(k) = ¼(k) if k 2 f1;:::;jSjg and ¼(0) = ¼(jSj + 1) = 0.






for every S ½ N.






for every S ½ N, where P(S) denotes the set of partitions of S.
It is readily seen that MLTS games are superadditive, i.e. v(S [T) ¸ v(S)+v(T) for all
S;T 2 2N with S \ T = ;, and monotonic, i.e. v(T) ¸ v(S) for all S;T 2 2N with S ½ T.
3Recall that the core of a cooperative game (N;v), is given by
Core(v) = fx 2 R





xi for any T ½ N. An element of the core gives an allocation of v(N) in
such a way that there is no coalition with an incentive to split o®.
The following example illustrates that LTS games and MLTS games can be di®erent.




















Figure 1: A complete graph representing the network (N0;T).
The associated LTS game is given by r(f1g) = 2, r(f2g) = 2, r(f1;2g) = t01 + t12 + t20 = 2.
Note that r(f1g) + r(f2g) = 4 > 2 = r(f1;2g). So Core(r) = ;.
The associated MLTS game is given by v(f1g) = 2, v(f2g) = 2, v(f1;2g) = maxfr(f1g)+r(f2g);
r(f1;2g)g = r(f1g) + r(f2g) = 4. In this case Core(v) = f(2;2)g. 2
It is readily seen that v = r if and only if t0i + t0j · tij for every i;j 2 N.
The following theorem states that every MLTS game with at most ¯ve players has a
nonempty core. The proof of this theorem can be found in section 4.
Theorem 2.2. Let (N;v) be an MLTS game with jNj · 5, then the core of (N;v) is
nonempty.
The following example provides a 6 player MLTS game with an empty core.
Example 2.3. Let the network (N0;T) be represented by the graph in Figure 2. All edges









































Figure 2: A graph representing the network (N0;T).
It is easy to check that the optimal tour of coalition f1;2;4;6g is (0;1;4;6;2;0) and
consequently v(f1;2;4;6g) = 11. Because of symmetry, v(f1;3;4;5g) = v(f2;3;5;6g) = 11.
An optimal tour of N is (0;1;4;5;6;2;3;0). Hence v(N) = 16:
Assume that x is a core element of this game. Then x(f1;2;4;6g) ¸ 11, x(f1;3;4;5g) ¸
11 and x(f2;3;4;5g) ¸ 11. So if we sum these inequalities we obtain 2x(N) ¸ 33 which
contradicts x(N) = 16. Hence, the core is empty. 2
The following Theorem shows that the value of every coalition only depends on the values
of one and two person subcoalitions.











for all S ½ N.












Let ½ 2 ¦(S) be the order in which the maximum on the right hand side is attained. Then
½ induces a tour on S in the following way: from 0 go to ½(1) and from ½(1) go directly to ½(2)
if t½(1)½(2) > t0½(1)+t0½(2) , otherwise go via 0 to ½(2). The decision to go from ½(k) directly to
½(k +1) or indirectly via 0 is made analogously depending on t½(k)½(k+1) > t0½(k) +t0½(k+1) or
5not, with k = 2;:::;jSj¡1. Finally from ½(jSj) go back to 0. Clearly, this tour generates a set
B of positions in f1;:::;jSj¡1g for which the tour goes back to zero; F = f1;:::;jSj¡1gnB









It is su±cient to show that R =
jSj¡1 X
k=1
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X
k2F
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To show the inverse we ¯rst suppose that there is a tour ½ such that




Since ½ 2 ¦(S) is optimal for S, it holds that t½(k)½(k+1) ¸ t0½(k) + t0½(k+1) for k 2

























































for every S ½ N
and that the equality holds when v(S) = r(S).
Finally, if there is no ½ such that (1) is satis¯ed, then there exists a partition hS1;:::;Sti
of S such that v(S) =
t X
j=1
r(Sj), and we can use the same argument for all partition elements
S1;:::;St separately. Aggregating the t formulas the result follows. 2
Observe that Theorem 2.4 is also true for LTS games.
In the following we will denote by (N0;T 01) a network in which the rewards of edges of T
equal either 0 or 1. The corresponding MLTS (LTS) games will be referred to as 0-1 MLTS
(LTS) games. It turns out that an optimal tour for a coalition S will visit the cities i 2 S
with t0i = 1 separately.






for every S ½ N, where S¤ = fi 2 S : t0i = 0g.





is a partition of S and (N;v) is superadditive.





















Let ½ 2 ¦(S) be the order in which the maximum is reached, then ½ induces a tour, that
is optimal in the corresponding MLTS problem, and sets B and F just as in the proof of
Theorem 2.4. Moreover, as t0i +t0j ¸ tij for every i 2 S nS¤, j 2 S it holds that ½(F) ½ S¤.
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v(fig) + r(F) ·
X
i2SnS¤




where the fourth equality holds since i 2 S¤ implies that t0i = 0. 2
3 0-1 MLTS games
In this section we investigate the structure of the core of 0-1 MLTS games.
For a network (N0;T 01) we denote by N¤ the set of players that are connected to city 0
with reward 0. So, NnN¤ is the set of players that are connected to city 0 with reward 1. From
8Theorem 2.5 it follows that every element of the core assigns to each player in NnN¤ exactly
2. For this reason we will restrict attention to standard networks with N = N¤ in the re-
maining part of this section. Observe that in this case 0-1 MLTS and 0-1 LTS games coincide.
A network (N0;T 01) induces a graph G1, where G1 is the undirected graph with set of
vertices N and set of edges E = ffi;jg ½ N : tij = 1g. The graph G1 is called traceable if
there exists a complete Hamiltonian path. A Hamiltonian path between vertices i and j is a
succession of connected vertices starting in i and ending in j such that all the vertices in the
succession appear exactly once. We say that a Hamiltonian path between vertices i and j is
complete if it visits all the vertices in the graph. A Hamiltonian path is closed if the starting
vertex and the end vertex coincide. A Hamiltonian cycle is a complete closed Hamiltonian
path. A graph is Hamiltonian if it contains a Hamiltonian cycle.
The following proposition states that traceability of G1 in a standard 0-1 MLTS problem is
equivalent to v(N) = jNj¡1 for the corresponding MLTS game. The proof is straightforward
and therefore omitted.
Proposition 3.1. Let (N;v) be an MLTS game corresponding to a standard network
(N0;T 01). Then v(N) = jNj ¡ 1 if and only if the graph G1 is traceable.
The following result implies that a 0-1 MLTS game has a nonempty core whenever the
associated graph G1 is traceable. Here eS 2 RN denotes the vector where eS
j = 1 if j 2 S
and eS
j = 0 otherwise.
Theorem 3.2. Let (N;v) be an MLTS game corresponding to a standard network (N0;T 01).
If G1 is traceable, then convfe
N ¡ e
fig : i 2 Ng ½ Core(v):
Proof: Let i 2 N and let xi = eN ¡ efig. It is su±cient to show that xi 2 Core(v). By
de¯nition xi(N) = jNj ¡ 1 = v(N) and xi(S) ¸ jSj ¡ 1 ¸ v(S) for every S ½ N. 2
The following theorem shows that the inclusion of Theorem 3.2 is an equality if G1 is
Hamiltonian.
Theorem 3.3. Let (N;v) be an MLTS game corresponding to a standard network (N0;T 01).
If G1 is Hamiltonian, then Core(v) = convfeN ¡ efig : i 2 Ng.
9Proof: By Theorem 3.2 it is su±cient to show that Core(v) ½ convfeN ¡efig : i 2 Ng.
Since G1 is Hamiltonian, it holds for i 2 N that v(N nfig) = jNj¡2. Since v(N) = jNj¡1
it follows that 0 = v(fig) · xi · v(N) ¡ v(N n fig) = 1 for every x 2 Core(v). Hence
C(v) ½ fx 2 R
N : xi 2 [0;1];
X
i2N
xi = jNj ¡ 1g. Because convfe
N ¡ e
fig : i 2 Ng = fx 2
R
N : xi 2 [0;1];
X
i2N
xi = jNj¡1g we can conclude that Core(v) ½ convfeN ¡efig : i 2 Ng.2
Next we show that an 0-1 MLTS game is convex whenever G1 is a line. Recall that a
cooperative game (N;v) is convex if v(S [ fig) ¡ v(S) · v(T [ fig) ¡ v(T) for every S ½
T ½ N n fig. For the proof of this result we need the concept of connected components of a
graph G, i.e. maximally connected subgraphs of G.
Theorem 3.4. Let (N;v) be an MLTS game corresponding to a standard network (N0;T 01).
If G1 is a line, then (N;v) is convex.
Proof: Let S ½ T ½ N nfig. We prove that v(S[fig)¡v(S) · v(T [fig)¡v(T). First
observe that for any i 2 N and U ½ N n fig it holds v(U [ fig) ¡ v(U) 2 f0;1;2g. Hence if
v(T [fig)¡v(T) = 2, the inequality is satis¯ed by the observation. If v(T [fig)¡v(T) = 1,
then i is connected to exactly one component of T in G1. Because G1 is a line it holds
that i is connected, at most, to one component of S in G1. So v(S [ fig) ¡ v(S) · 1. If
v(T [ fig) ¡ v(T) = 0, then i is not connected to any component of T in G1. Hence i is not
connected to any component of S in G1. So v(S [ fig) ¡ v(S) = 0. 2
Before we can state our next result we need the notion of 1-sum of two graphs that
arises from standard situations. Let G = (V;E) and H = (V 0;E0) be two graphs such that
jV \V 0j = 1. Then we de¯ne the 1-sum of G and H by G©H = (V [V 0;E[E0). The 1-sum
of more than two graphs is de¯ned in a recursive way.
Example 3.5. The graph in Figure 3 is 1-sum of the line L1 with set of players NL1 =
f1;2;3g and the Hamiltonian graphs H1, H2 with set of players NH1 = f3;4;5;6;7g and











































































































































Figure 3: 1-sum of Hamiltonian graphs and lines that is traceable.
Observe that in the associated MLTS game, (N;v), an optimal tour for N is given by
(0;1;2;3;4;5;6;7;8;9;10;0). So, v(N) = 9 which implies that the 1-sum of L1, H1, H2 is
traceable. 2
We will only consider traceable graphs that are 1-sum of line graphs L1;:::;Lq and

























Figure 4: 1-sums that are not traceable.
It is readily veri¯ed that to achieve traceability each line is coalesced to, at most, two
Hamiltonian graphs using its end vertices. Moreover, each Hamiltonian graph is coalesced
to, at most, two di®erent graphs (either two lines, or one line and one Hamiltonian graph,
or two Hamiltonian graphs) using two consecutive vertices in a Hamiltonian cycle.
Now consider a standard network (N0;T 01) such that G1 is traceable and such that
G1 is 1-sum of Hamiltonian graphs fHrg
p
r=1 and lines fLsg
q
s=1. We denote by NLs (NHr)
the set of players of Ls (Hr) and by vLs (vHr) the characteristic function of the MLTS









s=1 be such that x
Hr 2 Core(vHr) for every r 2 f1;:::;pg, x
Ls 2 Core(vLs) for every
11s 2 f1;:::;qg. We de¯ne x 2 RN by
xi =
8
> > > > > > <










i if i 2 NHR \ NHt;
x
Ls
i if i 2 NLs and i = 2 NHr for every r 2 f1;:::;pg;
x
Hr
i if i 2 NHr; i = 2 NLs for every s 2 f1;:::;qg and i = 2 NHt; t 6= r
(2)
Since G1 is traceable, (2) covers all cases.
Theorem 3.6. Let (N;v) be an MLTS game corresponding to a standard network (N0;T 01).





s=1. Then each vector x 2 RN as de¯ned in (2) is an element of Core(v).
Proof: Observe that there are exactly p + q ¡ 1 players that are in exactly two of the






























jNLsj ¡ p ¡ q = (jNj + p + q ¡ 1) ¡ (p + q) = jNj ¡ 1:
Next we show stability. Let ½ be an optimal tour of S ½ N in G1 and let E(½) denote the
set of edges in G1 covered by ½. Hence v(S) = jE(½)j. Obviously, E(½) \ E(L1);:::;E(½) \
E(Lq);E(½) \ E(H1);:::;E(½) \ E(Hp) is a partition of E(½), where E(Ls) and E(Hr)
denote the set of edges of Ls and Hr, respectively. Let A 2 fL1;:::;Lq;H1;:::;Hpg, we
can de¯ne an induced tour in S \ A in the following way. Let k1;:::;kjS\NAj be such that
k1 < k2 < ::: < kjS\NAj and ½(kl) 2 S\NA for every l. Then the induced tour is given by: from
0 go to ½(k1) and from ½(k1) go directly to ½(k2) if f½(k1);½(k2)g 2 E(½) \ E(A), otherwise
go via 0 to ½(k2). The decision to go from ½(kl) directly to ½(kl+1) or indirectly via 0 is made
analogously depending on f½(kl);½(kl+1)g 2 E(½)\E(A) or not, with l = 2;:::;jS\NAj¡1.
Finally from ½(kjS\NAj) go back to 0. Then, the total reward corresponding to this tour is
jE(½) \ E(A)j. Hence v(S \ NA) ¸ jE(½) \ E(A)j. Therefore
v(S) = jE(½)j = jE(½) \ E(L1)j + ::: + jE(½) \ E(Lq)j+
+ jE(½) \ E(H1)j + ::: + jE(½) \ E(Hp)j
· v(S \ NL1) + ::: + v(S \ NLq) + v(S \ NH1) + ::: + v(S \ NHp)
· x
L1(S \ NL1) + ::: + x
Lq(S \ NLq) + x
H1(S \ NH1) + ::: + x
Hp(S \ NHp)
= x(S): 2
12The following example shows that if G1 is not traceable the core of the corresponding
MLTS game can be empty.

















Figure 5: A non-traceable graph representing the standard network (N0;T 01).
In this case is easy to check that an optimal tour for N is (0,5,3,1,4,6,0,2,0) so v(N) =
4. An optimal tour for f1;2;3;5g is (0;2;1;3;5;0) and v(f1;2;3;5g) = 3. By symmetry
v(f1;2;4;6g) = 3 and v(f3;4;5;6g) = 3. Hence if x 2 Core(v) then, x(f1;2;3;5g) ¸ 3,
x(f1;2;4;6g) ¸ 3 and x(f3;4;5;6g) ¸ 3. Therefore, if we sum all the inequalities, we ¯nd
2x(N) ¸ 9 which contradicts x(N) = 4. Hence, the core is empty. 2
Finally we have
Theorem 3.8. Let (N;v) be an MLTS game corresponding to a standard network (N0;T 01).
If G1 is a tree, then (N;v) has a nonempty core.
The proof is straightforward because if G1 is a tree, then the corresponding 0-1 MLTS
game is ¡-component additive (see LeBreton et al. (1992)).
4 Relation between MLTS games and MTS games
In this section we prove Theorem 2.2. For this purpose we de¯ne multiple traveling salesman
(MTS) games and we show that they are related to MLTS games.
Let (N0;T) be a network as before, but with a di®erent interpretation: tij now represents
the costs of going from city i to city j, with i;j 2 N0.
13In a traveling salesman (TS) problem corresponding to the cost network (N0;T) a sales-
man, starting in city 0, has to visit each of the other cities exactly once and has to return
to city 0 at the end of the journey. The order of the cities is selected in such a way that the
total costs are minimized.
In a multiple traveling salesman (MTS) problem the salesman has to visit each city ex-
actly once but now the home city can be revisited several times instead of only at the start
and the end of the journey.
In Potters, Curiel and Tijs (1992) TS games arising from TS problems are introduced.
Analogously one can de¯ne MTS games arising from MTS problems where the players are
identi¯ed with the set of cities N = f1;:::;ng and each coalition of cities faces an MTS
problem.












for every S ½ N.
It is readily seen that given a cost network (N0;T) the corresponding TS and MTS co-
incide, if and only if t0i + t0j ¸ tij for every i;j 2 N.












for all S ½ N.
Observe that this result also holds for TS games.
Using the results in Potters, Curiel and Tijs (1992), Tamir (1989) and Kuipers (1991) we
can state the following result on the nonempty core of the traveling salesman game.
14Theorem 4.1. Let (N;·) be a TS game with jNj · 5 corresponding to a cost network
(N0;T) such that t0i + t0j ¸ tij for every i;j 2 N. Then, Core(·) 6= ;.
Now we show that every MTS game with at most ¯ve players has a nonempty core.
Theorem 4.2. Let (N;c) be an MTS game with jNj · 5 corresponding to a cost network
(N0;T). Then, Core(c) 6= ;.
Proof: We are going to construct a cost network (N0;U) such that the associated TS
game, (N;·), and (N;c) coincide.
Let U be de¯ned by u0i = t0i, uij = t0i + t0j if tij > t0i + t0j and uij = tij otherwise, for
every i;j 2 N.
The matrix of costs U satis¯es the triangular inequalities with respect to the home
location. Hence, using Theorem 4.1, (N;·) has nonempty core and it su±ces to show that
·(S) = c(S) for all S ½ N. Using (3) it is su±cient to prove that ·(S) = c(S) for all S ½ N
with jSj · 2.
Case 1: S = fig, with i 2 N.
·(fig) = 2u0i = 2t0i = c(fig):
Case 2: S = fi;jg, with i;j 2 N, i 6= j, such that tij > t0i + t0j,
·(fi;jg) = uij + u0i + u0j = (t0i + t0j) + t0i + t0j = 2t0i + 2t0j = c(fi;jg):
Case 3: S = fi;jg, with i;j 2 N, i 6= j, such that tij · t0i + t0j,
·(fi;jg) = uij + u0i + u0j = tij + t0i + t0j = c(fi;jg):
2
Next we will show how MLTS games and MTS games are related.
Theorem 4.3. Let (N;v) be an MLTS game. Then there exists an MTS game (N;c) and a
constant k 2 R such that v(S) = 2kjSj ¡ c(S) for every S ½ N.
Analogously, let (N;c) be an MTS game. Then there exists an MLTS game (N;v) and a
constant l 2 R such that c(S) = 2ljSj ¡ v(S) for every S ½ N.
15Proof: We will only prove the ¯rst part of the theorem, the second part is analogous.
Let (N;v) be an MLTS game corresponding to a (reward) network (N0;T). We de¯ne a cost
network (N0;U) by u0i = k¡t0i, uij = 2k¡tij for every i;j 2 N, with k 2 R such that U ¸ 0.
We will show that the MTS game, (N;c), associated to (N0;U) satis¯es v(S) = 2kjSj¡c(S)
for all S ½ N. Using Theorem 2.4 and equation (3) it is su±cient to prove this for S ½ N
with jSj · 2.
Case 1: S = fig, with i 2 N.
v(fig) = 2t0i = 2k ¡ (2k ¡ 2t0i) = 2k ¡ 2u0i = 2k ¡ c(fig):
Case 2: S = fi;jg, with i;j 2 N, i 6= j.
v(fi;jg) = maxftij + t0i + t0j; 2t0i + 2t0jg
= 4k ¡
¡
4k ¡ maxftij + t0i + t0j; 2t0i + 2t0jg
¢
= 4k ¡ minf2k ¡ tij + k ¡ t0i + k ¡ t0j; 2k ¡ 2t0i + 2k ¡ 2t0jg
= 4k ¡ minfuij + u0i + u0j; 2u0i + 2u0jg = 4k ¡ c(fi;jg): 2
Proof Theorem 2.2: It is now an immediate consequence of Theorem 4.2 and Theorem 4.3.
The following example provides a cost network (N0;T) such that the entries of T take
values 0 or 1 and the associated MTS game has an empty core.
Example 4.4. Let the cost network (N0;T) be represented by the graph in Figure 6. The
























Figure 6: A graph representing the cost network (N0;T).
16It is easy to check that the optimal tour of coalition f1;2;3;6g is (0;2;1;6;3;0) and con-
sequently c(f1;2;3;6g) = 1. Because of symmetry, c(f3;4;5;6g) = 1. An optimal tour of
f1;2;4;5g is (0;2;1;5;4;0), so c(f1;2;4;5g) = 0: An optimal tour of N is (0;2;1;6;5;4;3;0),
so c(N) = 2:
If x 2 Core(c) then x(f1;2;3;6g) · 1, x(f3;4;5;6g) · 1 and x(f1;2;4;5g) · 0. So if we
sum the inequalities we obtain 2x(N) · 2 which contradicts x(N) = 2. Hence, the core is
empty. 2
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